

15 September 1954

RECOMMENDATION #1

25X1A

The Director of Security should commend his personnel, including [REDACTED] for their excellence of performance, [REDACTED] extreme [REDACTED] difficult circumstances, and devotion to duty. They should know also that the Security Office is effectively carrying out the Security programs and policies of the Agency.

ACTION

This recommendation was implemented by a memorandum of commendation to all members of the Security Office, issued 27 July 1954 by the Director of Security.

OK

OK

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed, as of 16 September 1954, by positive action.

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RECOMMENDATION #2

An accelerated program should be devised for completing the polygraph interviews of the 331 on-duty employees at Headquarters. This backlog of interviews should be completed by the end of October 1954.

ACTION

The backlog of 331 Headquarters employees who have not been polygraphed has been reduced to 129 as of 7 September 1954. It is estimated that the polygraph program will be on a current basis by 1 November 1954.

*Check on 1 Nov.
+ follow until
complete —*

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed. As of 1 November there remain only 14 persons in headquarters who have not been polygraphed. Of this number, 7 are on vacation or TDY and will be interviewed on their return. The program is now considered to be on a current basis.

SECRET

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RECOMMENDATION #7

The DD/A should personally review the status of the Agency's Safety Program, and take steps to insure that a program sufficient to meet the demands of the Agency is developed.

ACTION

This Office is prepared to brief the DD/A on the Agency Safety Program at his convenience. This Office has experienced considerable difficulty in finding fully qualified and experienced safety men to fill the two safety officer slots available in this Office. One position has been filled continuously and the second position has only been filled temporarily for a few months. The incumbent of the second position has indicated he intends to leave soon.

With respect to the statement that only one scheduled fire drill took place in 1953, the record shows that nine fire drills were held during that year, but that only one drill had been held in 1954 up to the time of the Inspector General's survey. Subsequent to the Inspector General's survey, there have been seventeen fire drills held. This program of fire drills will continue to receive appropriate attention in the future.

As a matter of interest, the following statistics reflect the activity of the safety officer during the period of January 1954 through July 1954:

Fire and Safety Survey Reports	2	
Special Safety Investigations	89	
Floor loading decisions	46	
Fire Drills (Buildings)	18	
C.D. Evacuations (Air Raid Drill)(Buildings)	28	
Inspections re Construction, Remodeling, Moving	15	
Review of Emergency Evacuation Plans	8	
Emergency Planning Conferences and Meetings	12	
Safety Meetings	2	
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STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed. This program is receiving current attention, and is being kept advised.

Follow up -

15 September 1954

RECOMMENDATION #6

It is undesirable that CIA must depend on a guard force responsible to another agency with full Civil Service job protection. The DD/A and the Director of Security, in collaboration with General Counsel, should determine what administrative and legal problems must be overcome in order to develop a guard force trained and controlled by CIA.

ACTION

The matter of an independent CIA guard force has heretofore been given a great amount of consideration. It has been determined that until the Agency is housed in one building, it is not feasible administratively to establish an independent guard force.

Get briefed on this
+ follow up

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed. Action on this matter seems to depend upon the acquisition by the Agency of a new building.

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RECOMMENDATION #10

The Inspector General should conduct a specific review of the progress and degree of Agency-wide support and coordination of Project ARTICHOKE.

ACTION

The representative of the Inspector General's Office has been fully briefed by the Chief of the Security Research Staff, Security Office, on the subject of ARTICHOKE.

The Director of Security concurs in the recommendation of the Inspector General and suggests that such a review of Project ARTICHOKE be made on an Agency-wide basis.

OK✓

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed.

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RECOMMENDATION #12

The Personnel-Medical-Security Panel which considers complicated security cases at the request of the Director of Security should be expanded to include two additional disinterested persons, chosen from DD/P and DD/I components.

ACTION

The report is in error in stating that the Personnel-Medical-Security Panel considers complicated security cases. Cases which are referred to the Personnel-Medical-Security Panel are those of an administrative or medical nature which do not have security implications sufficient to be acted upon by the Security Office.

This Office does not concur in the recommendation that the Panel should be expanded.

I agree w/ Security
but should follow
up w/ Kirk

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed.

SECRET

15 September 1954

RECOMMENDATION #13

The status of the Inspection Division should be changed from a division to a staff since it is not a line command function.

ACTION

This recommendation was implemented on 29 July 1954.

OK

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed.

SECRET

15 September 1954

RECOMMENDATION

The Physical Security Branch should be made a division and five additional people be added to the I/O.

ACTION

Decision on action to change the Physical Security Branch to a division is being withheld pending completion of the current Management survey and a further study of other possible organizational changes within the Security Office structure. However, a request for additional personnel in the Physical Security Branch is presently being prepared at this time for submission to the Personnel Office.

*Wait for
Mgmt Study*

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed. Plans for changes in the organizational structure of the Security Office have been discussed with the Management Staff, in connection with their present survey of Security, wherein they have approved the establishment of Physical Security as a Division. Final action awaits the receipt of the Management Staff report.

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RECOMMENDATION #16

Consideration be given to classifying the position of Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, at the same grade in existence or recommended for the other Security Office Staff Chiefs.

ACTION

This recommendation has been accomplished.

OK ✓

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed.

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RECOMMENDATION #19

The Director of Security and other officials concerned should be commended on the soundness of the technical interview program.

ACTION

The Director of Security has received commendation from the DD/A and the Inspector General as a result of the subject Inspector General report.

OK

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed.

~~SECRET~~

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RECOMMENDATION #20

Appropriate action should be taken on suggestions made in the discussion section of this report regarding certain personnel changes, administrative corrections and modifications in some operational practices which may be of benefit to the various supervisors and several of the Security Office components.

ACTION

On Page 5, paragraph 5, includes the following statements: "CIA has additionally informed the Civil Service Commission that all regular positions in the Agency are sensitive positions and therefore come under the purview of Executive Order 10450. However, we continue to appoint as staff employees provisionally-cleared people, principally clerical help, whose continued employment is based on satisfactory completion of a full field investigation and technical interview."

Historically, the unclassified positions in the uncleared pool (IAB) have not been considered as "regular positions." Employees in that category are considered to be in a "hold" status and are not in "full duty" positions during that period. This arrangement has been permitted at the insistence of the Office of Personnel in order to afford the Agency a reasonably competitive position in the procurement of personnel in the lower grades, mainly clerical. As recently as 60 days ago, the Office of Personnel has requested that we handle provisional clearances on a 48-hour basis, inasmuch as applicants are being "lost" to other agencies who do not require pre-employment clearances.

Executive Order 10450 states that "the head of each department and agency of the Government shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security." Section 3 (a) states in part, "The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government

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Recommendation #20^a - ACTION, Cont'd.

"shall be made subject to investigation.....Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any such person may not be clearly consistent with the interests of national security, there shall be conducted with respect to such person a full field investigation, or such less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine whether retention of such person is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security."

Within the above framework, it is believed that the practice of provisional clearances under our present procedures is consistent with the interest of the national security. It is further considered that the Executive Order permits the employment of persons in non-sensitive positions before investigation is completed. The Security Office would prefer discontinuance of persons entering on duty under provisional clearances; however, it is recognized that for the successful operation of the Agency, consideration in this connection must be given to the personnel procurement problems of the Office of Personnel.

OHC
I agree

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed.

~~SECRET~~

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Recommendation #20 - ACTION, Cont'd.

b. Observation is made on page 15 of the report that an audit should be made to determine whether the position of Chief of the Operations Branch, Special Security Division should not be increased from grade GS-14 to GS-15.

This Office proposes to submit a request for the increase in grade from GS-14 to GS-15 for the position of Chief, Operations Branch, Special Security Division, when the current request for increase in grades of chiefs of field offices, now pending in the Office of Personnel, is resolved.

Follow up

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed. Colonel Edwards reported on this by memorandum dated 16 October.

SECRET

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Recommendation #20 - ACTION, Cont'd.

c. The report states on page 16 that consideration should be given to increasing the grades of personnel in the Covert Records Section so that more mature, professionally minded career people might be obtained for this operation.

No action will be taken on this suggestion until the current Management Survey is completed.

See what Mynt says

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

No change. Awaiting receipt of Management Staff survey.

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Recommendation #20 - ACTION, Cont'd.

j. Page 25, paragraph 6, states in part, "However, because of the great expense involved in affixing these devices to the 'safes,' an administrative determination has been made that, at this time, only safes in CIA overseas installations will be equipped with both devices."

This statement is misleading in that action has been taken for all Agency safes, overseas and domestic, to be equipped with a modification increasing their protective qualities.

follow up on
Progress

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed. Modification kits were ordered and are now in stock. It is estimated that their installation on domestic safes will require the work of two or three people full-time for one year. The question of furnishing labor for this project has been discussed informally with the Logistics Office. A formal memorandum requesting the Logistics Office to perform this service is due to be forwarded this week.

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Recommendation #20^K - ACTION, Cont'd.

b. Page 25, paragraph 8, suggests the development of a procedural manual for the Security Division and Branches.

Thought has been given to the development of such manuals; however, in view of the close integration of the Security Division and each of its branches, the necessity for independent judgment in connection with its problems, and considering the heavy work load of our various components, it has been felt that the formulation of such manuals should not be given high priority among the work requirements of the Division.

do this some day, however

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Suspended. This will be reconsidered again on 1 January 1955. I will report to you then.

J.A.C., JR.

SECRET

15 September 1954

Recommendation #20 - ACTION, Cont'd.

1. Page 25, paragraph 8, states that, "It was noted that the (Security) Division, while in possession of the needed raw material, did not keep compiled certain statistics which would appear to be highly essential from a security point-of-view." In this connection, the following were mentioned: "(a) the number of on-duty employees both in Washington and in the field who have not been polygraphed; (b) the number of on-duty employees who had been reinvestigated in the past fiscal year; (c) the number of case files containing reports of investigation equivalent to that required in staff employment applicant cases; and (d) dates of past physical inspections of properties for which this Division is responsible."

In view of the wide variety of statistics the Security Division is required to furnish over a period of time in connection with periodic reports, the operation of Executive Order 10450, etc., it is felt that we should strive mainly to maintain such "raw material" statistics as convenient for the compilation of almost any specific statistical data desired. To attempt to foresee all statistical needs would require an increase in Division personnel. The advisability of such increases is doubtful when considering their contribution to the security of the Agency.

OK

those mentioned
should not be
difficult.

STATUS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1954:

Closed. Action has been taken to keep those statistics mentioned by the Inspector General as not being available, with one exception. The exception concerns the number of case files containing reports of investigations equivalent to that required in staff employment applicant cases. This is considered impractical.

SECRET